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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TRENDS AND TOPICS
Fred G. Zundel, Idaho Legal Aid Services, Moscow
Patrick D. Costello, University of Idaho Legal Aid Clinic
INCIDENCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Recent Idaho domestic violence statistics tell a confusing and
apparently contradictory story. From 2003 to 2007, the annual filing of
domestic violence petitions decreased from 5,906 to 4,689, more than
a twenty-percent reduction. Over the same five years, yearly criminal
prosecutions for domestic assault or battery dropped from 3,917 to
2,678, a better than thirty-percent decline.
The largest declines in domestic violence case filings came in the
fourth, sixth, and seventh judicial districts. As it happens, these are the
three districts with "integrated domestic violence courts," in which all
of a family's pending legal issues- civil, criminal, juvenile, and child
protection- can be consolidated before one judge.
But while these numbers appear encouraging, if one looks instead
at incident reports and lethality statistics, rather than case filings, an
opposite trend is evident. Statewide, the Idaho State Police reports that
incidents of domestic violence reported to law enforcement actually
increased by 1.7%, to 6,360. The number of domestic violence-related
fatalities spiked in 2007, to a total of 22 statewide.'
We do have more services available for victims of domestic violence
than in the past. In addition to the three Domestic Violence courts,
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every judicial district now has a Family Court Services coordinator.
Family Court Services can arrange for visitation supervisors, can
make referrals to batterers' programs and other social services, and can
perform "Alternative Dispute Resolution" screenings under Rule 16(m)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure' We have one or more domestic
violence shelters in each district. Legal representation for domestic
violence and sexual assault victims is a high priority for Idaho Legal
Aid Services, the University of Idaho Legal Aid Clinic, and for the
Idaho Volunteer Lawyers Program, thanks to grant funding and other
resources provided by the Idaho Coalition against Sexual and Domestic
Violence. And the Coalition's Coordinated Response to Domestic and
Sexual Violence project has developed a new Model Risk Assessment
of Dangerousness Tool which is scheduled to be distributed to the Idaho
judiciary, attorneys, law enforcement, and shelters this month to help
gauge the level of risk present in various domestic violence situations.
RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
Legislation-the 2008 Idaho Legislature enacted three statutes
dealing with domestic violence. The most significant statute promises
to be the creation of a new "Address Confidentiality Program"
administered by the Idaho Secretary of State.4 Victims of domestic
violence, sexual assault or stalking may utilize this program to establish
a mailing address for official governmental purposes which does not
allow perpetrators to discover the victim's actual residential address
using public records. Between July 1, 2008, when the law went into
effect, and the end of October, three households totaling nine people
signed up for the program, according to the Secretary of State's office.5
The legislature also doubled penalties for crimes, including domestic
assault or battery, in which "conducted energy devices" (e.g. Tasers and
cattle prods) are used. It also provided for an enhanced penalty for the
third or subsequent conviction for violation of a no-contact order within
five years.
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Cases-there were no reported appellate decisions dealing with
Domestic Violence Protection Orders (DVPO's) this past year. Schultz
v. Schultz,7 dealt with domestic violence in the context of a custody case.
It distinguished Hopper v. Hopper,' which held that a move-away by
one joint custodian with the minor child to another state was not in the
best interests of the child. In Schultz, there was evidence (four unrefuted
incidents of domestic violence) that the non-move-away parent was an
habitual perpetrator of domestic violence, and the magistrate failed to
consider whether such evidence should have overcome the presumption
in favor of joint custody pursuant to Idaho Code § 32-717B(5). When
the move-away parent has been the victim of habitual domestic violence,
the Schultz decision indicates the move may well be deemed to be in the
child's best interests.
EMERGING ISSUES/PROBLEM AREAS
Mutual Protection Orders-in the years immediately following
the 1988 adoption of the Domestic Violence Crime Prevention Act,
Idaho Code § 39-6301, et seq., it was common for Idaho magistrates
to make Domestic Violence Protection Orders ("DVPOs") mutual, i.e.,
which prohibited both parties from having contact with each other, and
from coming near the other party. In fact, the first iteration of standard
DVPO forms approved by the Idaho Supreme Court contained a
check box the judge could use to easily make the DVPO's no contact
provisions apply mutually. The statutory authority cited for this practice
was Idaho Code § 39-6306(e), which authorizes the court to grant
"other relief ... as the court deems necessary for the protection of a
family or household member..." However, the Full Faith and Credit
provision of the federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) 9 only
applies to DVPOs restraining a Petitioner if the Respondent has filed his
own Petition seeking a protection order and the court has made specific
findings that each party is entitled to such an order. Since this will but
rarely reflect the typical domestic violence case, mutual DPVOs will
rarely satisfy these two conditions and will therefore not be entitled to
full faith and credit. Because of this, in 2006 the Idaho Supreme Court
modified the standard DVPO forms to eliminate the check box to make
the "no contact" provision mutual. Despite this change, some magistrates
around the state continue to enter mutual orders using the "other" space
on the DVPO forms," whether or not the Respondent has petitioned for
one, and without making express findings required by both I.C. § 39-
6306(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 2265(c). This practice seems to persist despite
education efforts by the Supreme Court and its Children and Families in
the Courts Committee to discourage it, and despite VAWA withholding
Full Faith and Credit for such orders. Not only does this practice render
the protection order unenforceable in other state or tribal courts, but it
arguably violates the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Many policy reasons have also been advanced as to why the practice
of entering mutual protection orders absent findings of culpability on
the part of the petitioner should be discouraged. Among them are that
such orders are confusing to police, the abuser, the parties' children and
the victim. They may result in either dual arrests or no arrests when
a violation of the order occurs. 2 And absent specific findings to the
contrary, they imply that the batterer needs protection from his or her
victim. But because of the fleeting nature of DVPO cases, the practice
of issuing mutual protection orders is one which continues to escape
appellate review.
Urinalysis Drug Testing in Domestic Violence Proceedings-the
Domestic Violence Crime Prevention Act allows for a magistrate to
issue a civil protection order that makes an award of temporary custody
of the minor children of the parties. 3 In determining custody, a child's
welfare and best interests are of paramount importance." The custody
factors found at I.C. § 32-717(1) would therefore apply to that custody
decision. Domestic violence as defined in I. C. § 39-6303 is one of those
factors."
Alcohol and drug abuse by a parent seeking custody is a relevant
consideration in a custody dispute. 6 "Substance use/abuse and intimate
partner violence (IPV) often co-exist .... Several studies indicate that a
significant proportion of domestic violence cases involve illicit drug use
or perpetrators with illicit drug use problems."' 7
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Idaho has no statute or rule that expressly allows a magistrate to order
a drug test of a party in a domestic violence or other civil proceeding.
And yet according to attorneys around the state, it would appear that
magistrates by and large do not hesitate to order drug testing in custody
disputes where there is evidence of drug use for at least one parent.
There are arguably four statutes or rules which provide that authority.
First, I.C. § 32-717(1) provides that the Court shall evaluate custody
of the children as shall be in their best interests, and that the Court shall
consider all relevant factors which may include seven enumerated
factors. The fifth such factor is "the character and circumstances of all
individuals involved." Credible evidence of drug use in one or both
parents reflects character and is clearly relevant to custody. Urinalysis
drug testing is a reliable test for recent use of illicit drugs. A court
therefore arguably has implicit discretion to order a urinalysis drug test
of such a parent in order to further the best interests of the children
involved.
Second, the Domestic Violence Crime Prevention Act provides
that after the full hearing on the merits, the court can order "temporary
custody" or that the respondent "participate in treatment or counseling
services" and "other relief ... as the court deems necessary for the
protection of the family or household member.... I.C. § 39-6306(1) (a,
d, and e). The foregoing argument for the inherent discretion of the court
to order drug testing in order to further the best interests of the children
would also apply in a domestic violence proceeding to order drug testing
for the same purpose. It may be a stretch to try to characterize an order
for drug testing as "treatment or counseling services." However, drug
testing could reasonably be interpreted as "other relief' where the court
deems that necessary for the protection of the children during times of
physical custody with the alleged drug-using parent.
Third, IRCP Rule 35(a) provides that "when the mental or physical
condition ... of a party, ... , is in controversy, the parties by stipulation
or the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit
to a physical or mental examination by a physician or a qualified mental
health professional .... " This rule by its terms would appear to apply
only to examination by a physician or mental health professional and
would therefore not strictly apply to a drug test. However, the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be liberally construed to secure the
just resolution of every action, and at least hospital labs are normally
supervised by a physician. Other jurisdictions, as indicated below, have
not hesitated to use their counterpart to Rule 35(a) to allow drug testing
in the context of a contested custody case.
Fourth, IRCP Rule 65(g) provides that "in suits for divorce ...
or custody of children, the court may make prohibitive or mandatory
orders with or without notice or bond as may be just." Upon credible
evidence that at least one parent is or has recently used drugs, it could
clearly be just, in furtherance of the best interests of the children, to
issue a mandatory order requiring that parent to submit to drug testing.
There are remarkably few cases nationwide, and none in Idaho,
that address the issue of the authority of a trial court judge to order
alleged drug-using parents to undergo drug testing. 8 Most of the
reported cases approve the use of their counterpart to IRCP Rule 35(a)
and find no constitutional problem with that approach. In Walsh v.
Ferguson,'9 the Texas Court of Appeals found that in order to compel
drug testing pursuant to the Texas counterpart of IRCP Rule 35(a), a
party must make an affirmative showing that a parent's mental or
physical condition was in controversy and that there was good cause
for such testing upon a showing of adequate proof. In the Pennsylvania
case of Luminella v. MarcocCi,2 the trial court's order that the mother
undergo random drug testing did not violate the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. The trial court had ordered such testing
for both parents. Although it did not specify its authority for this order,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the trial court could have
cited the Pennsylvania counterpart to IRCP Rule 35(a). Since that rule
did not require that the court articulate a basis of reasonable suspicion
for drug use based upon evidence presented by the parties, and no other
Pennsylvania statute required that basis, it was not necessary for the trial
court to do so to order drug testing. Such a rule facilitates the State's
exercise of its compelling interest in the welfare of the children.
In the case of Burgel v. Burgel,2' the New York Supreme Court
approved the New York counterpart to IRCP Rule 35(a) as a basis for
hair follicle testing in a child custody dispute. The husband alleged that
the wife was a cocaine user, and the wife admitted that she had used
cocaine in the past but claimed she was no longer a user. The trial court
ordered a hair follicle test pursuant to New York's version of IRCP Rule
35(a). The New York Supreme Court ruled that there was to be liberal
discovery in civil actions, that the wife's physical and mental condition
was at issue, and that where the welfare of the children was at stake and
the best interest of the children was of paramount concern, the broadest
possible latitude should be accorded to reasonable discovery requests.
Since this was a civil and not a criminal matter, Fourth Amendment
precepts were not implicated.
In Raney v. Raney,22 the Ohio Court of Appeals found inherent
authority in the trial court to order drug testing by finding that the best
interests of the children was the trial court's primary concern and that
there had been no abuse of discretion or constitutional defect in ordering
the father to undergo drug testing and imposing supervised visitation
until the drug test results had been received. "Drug testing may be
ordered or agreed to when the best interests of a child is at stake.
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The only jurisdiction that the authors have found that imposed
constitutional constraints on drug testing in custody disputes was
California. In Wainwright v. Superior Court of Humboldt County,24
the Court of Appeals found that California's statute allowing for
consideration of drug use in custody disputes did not justify a court
ordered drug testing. California at that time had a family law statute
that directed the trial court to consider certain factors in determining
the best interests of the child, including drug use by a parent. Mother
alleged father's drug use and requested drug testing. The trial court
assumed that it had jurisdiction to order drug testing based on the
statute, so it ordered a hair drug analysis with mother to pay the costs.
Father sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeals to vacate that
order, and the Court of Appeals held that the family law statute, without
any substantive or procedural safeguards, did not authorize any court
ordered drug testing.
In response to this case, the California legislature passed California
Family Code § 3041.5(a) for drug and alcohol abuse testing. It provided
that if there has been a judicial determination based on a preponderance
of the evidence that a parent is a habitual, frequent or continual illegal
user of controlled substances, or a habitual or continual abuser of alcohol,
then the trial court may order drug testing subject to the following
conditions: (1) the court must use the least intrusive method of drug
testing; (2) the drug testing must be in conformity with the procedures
and standards of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services for drug testing of federal employees; (3) the party subject to
the drug test has the right to request a hearing to challenge any positive
test results; (4) any positive test result alone shall not be grounds for
any adverse custody decision; (5) the test results shall be confidential
and shall not be disclosed to anyone other than as authorized by statute;
(6) any breach of that confidentiality shall be punishable by a civil fine
not to exceed $2,500.00; and (7) the test results may not be used for
any other purpose than in determining the best interests of the child in
the current proceeding. In the subsequent case of Deborah v. Superior
Court of San Diego County,25 the California Court of Appeals held that
the trial court could not order hair follicle testing pursuant to the new
California statute, since that statute requires that any court ordered drug
testing conform to federal drug testing procedures and standards, and
those standards currently only allow for urine tests.
The authors would suggest that Idaho courts have inherent
discretionary authority to order urinalysis drug testing in a domestic
24 The Advocate -January 2009
violence or other civil setting when the best interest of a child is at stake.
There is no language in the Domestic Violence Crime Prevention Act or
in reported cases requiring that the drug use or its effects occur during
an incident of domestic violence in order for the court to order the drug-
using parent to submit to drug testing. Such a requirement would ignore
the best interest of the children. Fourth Amendment concerns are not
implicated since the setting for such drug testing is a civil custody setting
and not a criminal case. If a court should prefer additional statutory or
rule authority, I.C. § 39-6306(1) (e), IRCP Rule 35(a), and IRCP Rule
65(g) would reasonably provide such authority. If any magistrate were
to be persuaded by the reasoning of the Wainwright decision, then it
could simply incorporate in its order the conditions for drug testing in
the California statute in order to satisfy any constitutional challenge to
the drug testing.
Recent and Remote Domestic Violence-When the Domestic
Violence Crime Prevention Act was enacted in 1988, a magistrate could
grant an ex parte temporary protection order upon an allegation that
"irreparable injury could result from domestic violence if an order [was]
not issued immediately without prior notice to the respondent,...." "
Irreparable injury "includes but is not limited to situations in which the
respondent has recently threatened the petitioner with bodily injury or
has engaged in acts of domestic violence against the petitioner."27 If a
magistrate granted an application for an ex parte temporary protection
order, then a full hearing would be set for not later than 14 days from the
issuance of the temporary order.28
After a hearing, the magistrate can extend the ex parte temporary
order for up to one year "upon a showing that there is an immediate
and present danger of domestic violence to the petitioner ...."29 The
definition of "immediate and present danger" largely tracks the definition
of "irreparable injury" and "includes but is not limited to, situations in
which the respondent has recently threatened the petitioner with bodily
harm or engaged in domestic violence against the petitioner."3 Based
upon the foregoing statutory definitions, magistrates often assumed that
they could extend a protection order only upon a showing of a recent
threat or act of domestic violence. Based on current anecdotal evidence,
magistrates, in interpreting the word "recent," tend to require that the
threat or domestic violence occur no more than three weeks prior to the
filing of an application for the temporary order. There is no statutory
definition for the word "recent" and no appellate interpretation of the
word.
However, in 2006 the legislature expanded the definition of
"immediate and present danger" from recent threats or recent domestic
violence to include situations "where there is reasonable cause to believe
bodily harm may result."3 This third prong for issuing a protection order
does not include any reference to recent threats of domestic violence,
and there is no reasonable interpretation of its language that could
transport the word "recently" to its meaning. A magistrate may therefore
issue a one year civil protection order upon a showing of recent threats
of bodily harm, recent acts of domestic violence, or where there is
reasonable cause to believe bodily harm may result to the petitioner.
This third prong to the definition of "immediate and present danger"
is a sensible addition to the definition. It could apply to the situation
where a petitioner learns that a prior perpetrator of felony domestic
violence against the petitioner is about to be released from prison and
the petitioner believes that, based upon his or her cooperation with
law enforcement that put the perpetrator in prison, he or she needs the
protection of the law for at least some period of time after the perpetrator's
release from prison. There could clearly be reasonable cause to believe
that bodily harm may result to the petitioner, even though there have
been no recent threats or acts of violence by the perpetrator against the
petitioner.
Another possible scenario would include the case of a petitioner
who has been subject to severe unreported domestic violence in a cycle
that includes acts of domestic violence every two or three months. The
petitioner knows the cycles of the perpetrator and what tends to set him
off, notwithstanding his or her efforts to avoid the violence, and the
petitioner now realizes that the next domestic violence episode is about
to occur. Although there have been no recent acts of domestic violence,
the petitioner has genuine reasonable cause to believe that bodily harm
may result without the legal protection of a civil protection order. A
magistrate who is well-informed about the patterns of domestic violence
would be sensitive to the petitioner's fear, and would only need credible
evidence of those patterns in the particular case to feel warranted in
issuing a protection order to the petitioner.
CONCLUSION
Domestic violence continues to present a significant problem
throughout the State of Idaho. Increasing services are available for
victims of domestic violence, and the 2008 Idaho Legislature took steps
to address the issue of domestic violence by enacting three pieces of
legislation. However, problem areas-or areas needing further judicial
analysis-still exist, particularly with respect to mutual protection
orders, court ordered drug testing, and protection orders for petitioners
who reasonably fear domestic violence but have not experienced a recent
episode. The authors encourage other family law attorneys to share their
views on these topics and to engage in dialogues regarding other trends,
emerging issues, and problem areas they have encountered.
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